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Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 51 (August 25, 2005)1
CRIMINAL LAW – DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
Summary
In this case, the Court considered two issues related to DUI charges against
appellant. First, whether a jury may properly convict a defendant charged with driving
under the influence of intoxicants based upon alternate theories of criminality. Second,
whether prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of a conviction based upon
conflicting evidence.
The Court concluded with respect to the first issue that although jury verdicts
must be unanimous, a jury need not be unanimous as to a particular theory of culpability
for a single offense to sustain a conviction. Thus, a unanimous general verdict of guilt
will support a conviction so long as there is substantial evidence in support of one of the
alternate theories of culpability. As for the second issue, the Court held that prosecutorial
misconduct requires reversal of a conviction based upon a plain error analysis.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court reversed the conviction of felony DUI and remanded to the district
court for a new trial.
Factual and Procedural History
On May 12, 2001 NHP observed a bearded shirtless man driving a pickup with a
young man in the passenger seat speeding at 89 miles per hour in a 70 mile-per-hour
zone. NHP noticed one of the pickup’s wheels touch the shoulder and after effecting a
traffic stop noticed that the shirtless man, Anderson, emerged from the passenger-side
door while Anderson’s 14-year-old son remained in the driver’s seat. When the state
trooper asked Anderson why he switched places with his son, Anderson first denied
doing so and then said he was just being a “stupid sh--.” The troopers smelled alcohol on
Anderson and he failed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test. Subsequent
breath testing confirmed blood-alcohol levels in excess of the statutory minimums.
The prosecution charged Anderson with felony DUI, third offense. At trial the
jury found Anderson guilty. Anderson appeals.
Discussion
A.

1

Reliability of the jury’s verdict

Summarized by Bryce C. Loveland

The State prosecuted Anderson on all three statutory theories for DUI criminal
liability: (1) operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and/or
(2) operating a motor vehicle while having 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in
the blood, and/or (3) being found by measurement within 2 hours after driving or being in
physical control of a vehicle to have 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the
blood.2 The jury unanimously found Anderson guilty of all three theories.
Anderson argues that the verdict is unreliable because the State presented no
evidence in support of the second theory. Moreover, there is no way of knowing whether
the jury was unanimous as to any one theory. The Supreme Court disagrees.
Although NRS 175.481 requires unanimous verdicts, the Court has previously
held that a jury need not be unanimous as to a particular theory of culpability for a single
offense to sustain a conviction.3 In this case, however, adjudication of guilt was not
dependent upon a general verdict based upon alternate theories of culpability. Rather, the
jury was given the task of separately determining each of the statutory theories of
criminality. Thus, it was necessary for the jury to issue a unanimous verdict as to one of
the three theories. Although the jury clearly erred in finding Anderson guilty under the
second theory, it still issued a unanimous verdict as to the other two. Because substantial
evidence exists in the record supporting the jury’s findings on the remaining theories, this
error with respect to the second theory was harmless.
B.

Prosecutorial misconduct

The Court explained that the relevant inquiry to determine whether prosecutorial
misconduct occurred is whether the prosecutor’s statements so infected the proceedings
with unfairness as to result in a denial of due process.4 Factors in determining infection
with unfairness include: (1) A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness,
(2) accuse a witness of lying, (3) use a defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment
purposes, and (4) refer to a defendant’s post-arrest silence in its case-in-chief. These
factors were met at trial when the prosecutor accused Anderson and his son of lying, used
Anderson’s post-arrest silence against him and in the case-in-chief, advised the jury that
it had a duty to convict Anderson, and by offering personal opinions as to the verity of
witnesses.
Reversal, however, is unnecessary if the prosecutor’s statements were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court further explained that the prosecutor’s statements
are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the statements were merely passing in nature,
or there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. Although Anderson failed to object to these
statements at trial, appellate review is not precluded because the prosecutor’s statements
were plainly erroneous. Furthermore, the statements compel reversal because they were
not made in passing and the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming. Anderson’s
argument that it is virtually impossible to make a change of drivers at high speed,
2

NEV. REV. STAT. 484.379 (2004).
Citing Evans v. State, 113 Nev. 885, 895-96, 944 P.2d 253, 260 (1997).
4
Citing Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47, 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004).
3

especially when the driver is highly intoxicated and the passenger underage and
inexperienced, raises arguable reasonable doubt.
Finally, the prosecutor’s statements changed the focus of the case to his personal
views and away from the evidence, which prejudiced Anderson. The Court concluded its
discussion by admonishing the prosecutor for such misconduct and threatened state bar
discipline for repeating this type of “adversarial rhetoric.”
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the jury verdict is valid because the jury was unanimous
as to two theories of culpability that are supported by substantial evidence. However, the
prosecutorial misconduct in this case warrants plain error review because it affected
Anderson’s substantial rights. Accordingly, the Court reversed Anderson’s conviction
and remanded the matter to the district court for a new trial.

